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Recent French Legal Developments
Concerning a War-Time Arrest and
Imprisonment Case
VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN†
Mais qu’est-ce que le savoir? Le savoir, c’est comme l’amour, il faut
alimenter et nourrir cette lampe ardente de notre connaissance, de
peur que son contenu même se dessèche, devienne théorique et
s’inscrive en figures pâles et abstraites sur nos consciences
vite en repos.
Jacqueline Mesnil-Amar, Ceux qui ne dormaient pas
_______________________

Some months ago, I gave a talk at the University of Maryland
School of Law about the French Lipietz case, which had ignited
† Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Unless otherwise noted,
translations are mine. My thanks to Professor William Reynolds for his
instantaneous contacting of student editors at the Maryland Journal of
International Law to arrange for the publication of the three documents concerning
the Lipietz case; to Dean Michael Van Alstine for inviting me to speak at the
University of Maryland Law School; to Professor Peter Quint for being a
wonderful host and for initiating the series of coincidences that led from Pittsburgh
to Baltimore to Toulouse; and to Alisha L. Jacobsen and Juliana Galan for
translating the two documents that follow my comments.
JACQUELINE MESNIL-AMAR, CEUX QUI NE DORMAIENT PAS, JOURNAL, 19441946 190 (2d ed. Stock, 2009) (éditions de Minuit, 1957) (“But what is knowledge?
Knowledge is like love, an ardent lamp that must be fed and nourished by our
learning, for fear that its very contents may dessicate, become theoretical and
inscribed in pale and abstract terms in our speedily quiescent consciences.”).
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passions and passionate debate within France when a lower
administrative court ruled for the plaintiffs.1 The dramatic facts of the
case are recounted in the Advisory Opinion to that court, which
follows.2 The facts concern the arrest and imprisonment by “Vichy
France,” as the collaborationist 1940–44 war-time government of
France is known, of two cousins deemed Jewish pursuant to that
regime’s anti-Semitic laws.
In the course of my talk, I mentioned that the Advisory Opinion of
the commissaire du gouvernement,3 more or less the equivalent of the
European Court of Justice’s Advocate General,4 had never been
published in a French legal periodical or journal. Indeed, it had been
rejected for publication, despite the controversy the case and
judgment had spawned throughout the country, which ordinarily
would have ensured its finding ready placement. By the end of my
talk, to my astonishment, my kind hosts had secured an offer from the
Maryland Journal of International Law to publish the Advisory
Opinion, which follows these introductory remarks and on which the
lower court’s decision was based.5
The Advisory Opinion enters into greater detail than the court
decision and refers to numerous cases which, taken together,
buttressed the court’s judgment. As the reader may observe, the
Advisory Opinion’s analysis of the statutory limitations period covers
the Lipietz plaintiffs’ claims, but, given that the court decision was
1. M. A et consorts Lipietz c/Préfet de la Haute-Garonne et Société nationale des
chemins de fer français, No. 0104248, Tribunaux administratif de Toulouse [TA]
[Administrative Court] June 6, 2006 (Fr.) [hereinafter Lipietz Decision], available
at http://helene.lipietz.net/IMG/pdf/jugement.pdf. An English translation of the
decision is available at http://lipietz.net/spip.php?article1891.
2. See Conclusions de Jean-Christophe Truilhé, Commissaire du gouvernement,
translated in 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 271 (2010) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
3. The commissaires du gouvernement became known as rapporteurs publics on
February 1, 2009. See Decree No. 2009-14 of January 7, 2009, Journal Officiel de
la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], January 8, 2009, p.
479. This change in an institution of French law that had existed since 1831
followed a European Court of Human Rights decision which criticized the French
institution as a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. See Kress v. France, 2001–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-in-en.
4. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and
Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 363, 374 n.63
(2008).
5. See generally Lipietz Decision, supra note 1.
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rendered in 2006, it also would have cut off future similarly situated
plaintiffs within a few months from asserting a cause of action.6 The
plaintiffs had argued several alternative theories with respect to the
limitations period. First and foremost, they had urged the court to
hold that no statute of limitations applied because the underlying acts
were crimes against humanity.7 Under French law, the crime against
humanity is unique in not being subject to a statute of limitations.8 In
losing on this point, the plaintiffs did not subject their own case to
defeat, but the innovative legal theory that had permitted them to seek
legal recourse for harm, where similarly situated plaintiffs always had
failed before,9 would be of extremely limited benefit to future
plaintiffs unless a higher court reinterpreted the limitations period
more favorably. This was not to happen.
The plaintiffs had sued both the French government and the
national railroad company, the société nationale des chemins de fer
(SNCF). The French government never appealed the lower court’s
verdict against it, but the SNCF did appeal, ultimately leading to the
French Council of State, the supreme court of administrative law,
affirming a reversal that the SNCF won from the Court of Appeals of
Bordeaux.10 The Lipietz plaintiffs then applied to a European court,
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Whether or not one
considers the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice properly to
be called supreme courts, the supranational European courts represent
the final legal resort and ultimate appellate recourse. A finding of a
violation on the French legal system’s part by the ECtHR would have
signified the nullification of the French national decision. However,
the ECtHR deemed the plaintiffs’ application to be inadmissible, so
6. See Curran, supra note 4, at 389.
7. See Lipietz Decision, supra note 1; Advisory Opinion, supra note 2.
8. For an account of how this came about, see generally Vivian Grosswald
Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: Democracy’s Suicide
in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1998).
9. See Curran, supra note 4, at 386–88. One of those who had failed before,
Kurt Schaechter, is mentioned in the essay of maître Rouquette. See Rémi
Rouquette, The French Administrative Court’s Rulings on Compensation Claims
Brought by Jewish Survivors of World War II, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 304 (2010).
10. For the two appeals, see Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français c/
MM. Georges Lipietz et A., 06BX01570, Cour Administrative d’Appel de
Bordeaux [CAA] [Court of Administrative Appeals], Mar. 27, 2007 (Fr.), available
at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/France/Lipietz_Appel_27-32007.pdf; Mme L. et autres, No. 305966, Conseil d’Etat [CE] (High-administrative
Court), Dec. 21, 2007 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/cde/node.php?
articleid=823.
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the plaintiffs’ lower court victory stood against the government but
not against the SNCF.11
An additional document concerning Lipietz follows the Advisory
Opinion in these pages: an essay by maître Rémi Rouquette, lawyer
for the Lipietz plaintiffs.12 The reader will notice that maître
Rouquette alludes to the Hoffman-Glémane case.13 Hoffman-Glémane
was instituted in the aftermath of the lower court holding in Lipietz;
the issue the Council of State resolved in that case was whether the
statute of limitations had run against the French government. The
Court held that it had.14
The Lipietz case intertwines two important strands of European
law. The first is the law’s role in dealing with collective memory, an
issue that looms in many states from Europe to Africa. In France,
attitudes towards the nation’s role during the Second World War have
evolved politically, socially, historiographically, and legally. A
second noteworthy strand of the case, not entirely unrelated to the
first, is globalization’s effect on national law.
With respect to Lipietz, my own previous attention has been
concentrated primarily on this second strand,15 in particular on
examining how the lower court decision, unchallenged by the
government, marked a transition in French law that showed the
effects of foreign, primarily American, tort law influence seeping into
French domestic law. Among my theories as to why the Council of
State ruled against the plaintiffs in Lipietz (and similarly in HoffmanGlémane) is the difficulty a civil law legal order would experience in
adapting to a common law importation for which the surrounding
legal terrain had not adequately been prepared, as is most likely to
occur where, as here, the change is precipitated by a court decision. 16
In such situations, a society can be ill-equipped to handle the
11. Lipietz v. France, E.Ct.H.R, (16 Dec. 2009, No. 49637/09), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=859949&por
tal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&tabl
12. See Rouquette, supra note 9.
13. Id.
14. See Hoffman-Glémane, No. 315499, Conseil d’Etat [CE Ass.] (HighAdministrative Court), Feb. 16, 2009 (Fr.), available at http://arianeinternet.conseil
etat.fr/arianeinternet/ViewRoot.asp?View=Html&DMode=Html&PushDirectUrl=1
&Item=1&fond=DCE&Page=1&querytype=advanced&NbEltPerPages=5&Pluriels
=True&dec_id_t=315499.
15. See Curran, supra note 4.
16. See id. at 398–400.
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consequences of the initial change in law.
Indeed, as maître Rouquette states, a vast number of new lawsuits
were begun after the Lipietz plaintiffs won their case in 2006.17 They
started almost immediately. In a comparable situation in the United
States, most of those plaintiffs could have been members of a single
class action lawsuit.18 Since nothing similar to the American class
action suit exists in France, the Council of State was able to foresee
how the already-taxed judiciary would reel under the burden of
thousands of additional cases. Other problems also might be
significant. Plaintiffs would not be able to secure legal services on a
contingency basis, since contingency fees are impermissible in
France, with concomitant financial strain on less prosperous
plaintiffs.19 These difficulties indirectly would have resulted from
globalization, inasmuch as Lipietz reflected foreign legal influences
that caused an Anglo-Saxon style tort case to proceed outside of the
criminal law framework, a framework which French law mandates
17. See Rouquette, supra note 9. For an interview with two lawyers of postLipietz plaintiffs, see Jordan Pillet, La SNCF rattrapée par les trains de la mort, 9
CULTURE DROIT 16 (Sept.–Oct. 2006).
18. For relevant comparative information in this area, see Rhonda Wasserman,
Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (Univ. of Pitt. Legal Studies Research Paper Ser.,
Working Paper No. 2010-04), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a
bstract_id=1554472.
19. The contingency fee system is considered unethical under French law.
Known as the pacte de quota litis, it is prohibited as against public policy, although
a lawyer under some conditions may contract for remuneration based on “result.”
See Law No. 71-1130 of December 31, 1971, modified by Decree No. 91-1197 of
July 10, 1991, art. 10, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], July 11, 1991, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich
Texte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068396&dateTexte=20100423. The French
private law supreme court, or Cour de cassation, confirmed most recently in
January 2010 that the laws permit contingency fee structures only in addition to,
not in lieu of, a fixed fee structure. See Deuxiéme chambre civile [Cass. 2e civ.]
[Second Civil Court of Appeal], Jan. 21, 2010, Bulletin des Arrêts, chambres
civiles No. 2, Jan. 2010 (Fr.), available at http://www.avocatparis-bdd.org/GEIDE
File/Cass_civ2_100121_07-10791.htm?Archive=196601391488&File=Cass+Civ+
21%2D01%2D2010+n%B007%2D10791+%28htm%29. The absence of a U.S.style contingency fee basis or class action suit would have posed a severe challenge
to the French legal order. In the particular case of plaintiffs similarly situated to
Lipietz et al., there appear, however, to have been a group of attorneys, l’ordre de
Cicéron, prepared to take the work on a pro bono or greatly reduced basis. See
Hélène Lipietz, L’Affaire Lipietz rebondit: Une demande d’avis au Conseil d’Etat
audiencée le 6 Février 2009, at 3–4, Feb. 4, 2009, http://helene.lipietz.net/spip.php
?article182.
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for cases dealing with crimes against humanity.20
Law’s transnationalization, or the second Lipietz strand, is not,
however, the focus of the two documents that follow my remarks.
The innovative Advisory Opinion by M. Truilhé explains the case
and the law in detail, including how the case came to be brought so
many years after the relevant events transpired. It covers the history
of the French administrative courts, ostensibly through their
reasoning on issues of statutes of limitations concerning acts by the
Vichy French government. It also suggests what lay at the source of
the statutory interpretations, some seemingly paradoxical: how it was,
for instance, that the great French legal scholar and opponent of
Vichy, René Cassin, laid the groundwork for a case law that had
relieved the French governments of the Fourth and Fifth Republics of
liability for crimes committed in the name of the French State by the
1940–44 collaborationist government of Pétain.
Those who suffered most during the dark years of Vichy were to
learn that there were unsung heroes as well as collaborators and
profiteers. Jacqueline Mesnil-Amar, a Jewish woman whose family
had been French for many generations, wrote in Paris on July 29,
1944, after the arrest of her beloved husband and from the depth of
insight which tragedy can bring, that “real life is choosing” (la vraie
vie, c’est choisir).21 M. Truilhé and the Administrative Court of
Toulouse, which adopted his opinion as its own in almost all respects,
made a choice consistent with great courage and a subtle, generous
understanding of French legal history. The evolution from post-war
governmental nonliability to liability involved complex issues.
Initially, it had seemed most compelling for the post-war,
democratic Fourth Republic to repudiate Vichy as illegal,
consistently with the arguments de Gaulle and his legal advisors
among the Free French had been making from London to their
French compatriots in occupied France, as they urged the latter not to
consider their duty or patriotism to consist in loyalty to the so-called
Etat français, the “French State,” as Pétain dubbed his new regime to
20. This is a principal theme of my article, Globalization, Legal
Transnationalization and Crimes against Humanity: The Lipietz Case. See Curran,
supra note 4. For a recent article on the interface in the French legal system
between criminal and civil law, see Véronique Tellier, En finir avec la primauté du
criminel sur le civil!, 4 REV. DE SCIENCE CRIM. & DR. PÉNAL COMPARÉ 797 (2009).
21. MESNIL-AMAR, supra note *, at 34.
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show its rupture with the republican past and, indeed, all that had
flowed from the French Revolution. It then seemed logically
irreconcilable for the newly reestablished Republic simultaneously to
accept continuity for Vichy’s most heinous side in the form of legal
liability. Thus, as a result of the immediate post-war reaction to assert
that the Fourth Republic had no link whatsoever with the
collaborationist regime of Vichy, and for an abundance of other
reasons as well, victims of Vichy were not able to assert claims
successfully against the new French government. As the years went
by, the solutions adopted were to prove too simplistic and
increasingly ill suited to the times. It was M. Truilhé’s advice to the
Administrative Court of Toulouse to extend an already-evolving law
to its logical conclusion. The court agreed, and the French
government did not appeal, so the Advisory Opinion, which traces
prior case decisions and legal reasoning in a manner that an official
French court decision cannot do, remains a landmark, and its author
one whose wide knowledge of his field has nourished it and kept it
from desiccating, as Jacqueline Mesnil-Amar cautioned against in the
words I quote at the beginning of these remarks.
Maître Rouquette’s essay, which ends this trilogy, focuses on
historical and legal aspects of the case from his unique perspective as
a zealous advocate immersed in the history of his country and in his
devotion to a cause. Like Mme Mesnil-Amar, he too is an opponent
of the “quiescent conscience.” Both maître Rouquette and M. Truilhé
will offer the American reader a glimpse into the thinking of French
patriots who, as de Gaulle famously wrote of himself, continue to
have a certain idea of France.

